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Abstract: Since the 1990s, a public debate has increasingly emerged about the ramifications of 
the advancing trade governance agenda with respect to governments’ domestic policy space 
to develop equitable and sustainable development. In this paper we firstly conduct a literature 
study to explain how one can read the scholarly debate and assessments on policy space. It is 
illustrated that the two camps in the public debate are replicated in scholarly analyses, with 
one side stressing the necessity of rules and the many exemptions still available, while the 
other focuses on the many de facto constraints this brings with it. In doing this, we show that 
the role of ideology and interpretation in scholarly debates may not be downplayed. Secondly, 
we show that sketching policy debates in this way also helps to understand recent debates 
about EU FTAs, which we illustrate with the examples of the EU-Central America Agreement 
and TTIP.  
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1 – Introduction 
As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) celebrated its 50th 
anniversary, it dedicated its annual Trade and Development Report to ‘Global governance and 
policy space for development’. The underlying concern was that the progressing trade 
liberalization agenda had an impact on the “(…) freedom and ability of governments to identify 
and pursue the most appropriate mix of economic and social policies to achieve equitable and sustainable 
development in their own national contexts, but as constituent parts of an interdependent global 
economy.”(UNCTAD, 2014). Various conceptualizations of ‘policy space’ in the scholarly 
literature  (Mayer, 2009; Shadlen, 2005; Wade, 2003) focus on the following three elements: it 
is about (i) the policy tools or resources that can or cannot longer be used, to (ii) reach certain 
goals, such as equitable or sustainable development, (iii) in the context of an interconnected 
world economy.  
Even though the issue of shrinking room to manoeuvre (amongst others through international 
agreements) has been around a long time (see e.g. Chang, 2006), the term itself and the debate 
about the (perceived) problems accompanied with it, should be situated somewhere at the 
beginning of this millennium. In parallel with various advancements in global trade 
governance, such as NAFTA (1994), completion of the Uruguay Round (1994) and the 
establishment of the WTO (1995), a political and scholarly debate emerged about the 
relationship between this agenda and domestic manoeuvring space. Indeed, in UNCTAD’s 
Sao Paolo Consensus (2004), it was argued that the continued interdependence of national 
economies in a globalized world, combined with the emergence of a rules-based trade regime, 
meant that the space for national economic policy (especially in trade, investment and 
industrial policy) was now increasingly embedded in international disciplines and obligations. 
This relationship between international and domestic politics has always been sensitive 
(Gourevitch, 1978), in particular the link between international economic integration and the 
domestic space to conduct the most appropriate policy (Mayer, 2009). In the post-WO II 
period, a sustainable equilibrium in this respect was even actively pursued. The architecture 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947), for example, foresaw specific 
exemptions to the free trade regime, to craft room for countries to socially and domestically 
embed their economies. John Ruggie famously argued that this post-war period was 
characterised by ‘embedded liberalism’ (1982)1: the construction of an international economic 
system designed to facilitate free trade, but with parallel provisions (such as the possibility to 
install quotas when one foresees problems with the balance of payments) for Member States 
to opt out when the excesses of the system clashed with domestic preferences or strengthened 
imbalances. In other words, policy space allowed for domestic support for economic openness 
through the protection of the vagaries of such a system (Hays, 2009; Rodrik, 1997). 
                                                          
1 The concept of markets being ‘dis-embedded’ from society is originally from Karl Polanyi’s (1944) work ‘The 
Great Transformation’ 
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Since the 80s and 90s, however, the argument that the policy space of (mainly developing) 
countries is shrinking (or under pressure) through various international (economic) 
agreements is gaining ground, driven also by academic work (Chang, 2006; Rodrik, 2007). The 
argument is that economic globalization, with international trade rules in particular, has put 
(developing) countries in a straightjacket, limiting their policy options to conduct “industrial 
policies” and precluding the strategies that worked for the growth superstars such as China 
and India  (Rodrik, 2007). Directly opposed to this, is the view that the current trade 
governance – the WTO in particular – leaves enough room to pursue development, and that 
rules are benefitting countries’ adoption in a globalized world. It seems therefore that two 
camps have formed in the public space about the relationship between the international trade 
governance and domestic policy space.  
Mosley (2005) shows that a similar divide can be discerned in the (closely related) debate about 
the link between economic globalization and the so-called ‘race to the bottom’. She argues that 
two explanations contribute to this divide: a lack of empirical material, and ideology. This 
brings us to think about two things: first, what is the empirical, scholarly, evidence related to 
the issue of policy space under international trade rules, and what are the main dividing lines? 
Secondly, if fault lines can be found in the literature, are they still applicable to more recent 
debates as well? 
The first goal of this paper is therefore to shed some clarity on this debate, by focusing on 
scholarly evaluations of policy space under the WTO and the subsequent push towards 
bilateral agreements. We show that the viewpoints in these accounts can be conceptualized in 
terms of dichotomy between de jure and de facto constraints. Importantly, however, we also 
point towards the role that ideology and interpretation can play in these scholarly arguments. 
Remarkably then, the two camps distilled from the literature in this way overlap to a 
considerable extent with the camps discernible in the public debate. This indicates that 
ideology might play a prominent role in scholarly analysis as well, and points towards the 
necessity of more empirical research. 
The second goal of this paper is to show that these two camps distilled from WTO analyses on 
policy space, can be applied to other debates related to economic globalisation/ trade 
liberalization, and can as such be considered a useful heuristic to situate political and scholarly 
evaluations of policy space. To illustrate this, we focus on the push towards bilateral 
agreements after the stalling of the Doha Development Round, and on two bilateral-regional 
EU agreements after the 2006 Global Europe trade strategy: the EU-Central America 
Association Agreement (EU-CA AA) and the ongoing negotiations on TTIP. As such, we 
include both North-South and North-North agreements. 
The paper is structured as follows: in chapter 2 we present the theoretical de jure/de facto 
divide that separates scholarly analyses about policy space under the WTO. Chapter 3 
documents the push towards bilateral agreements and how this can be understood in the same 
terms. Chapter 4 provides our empirical part, which shows that the same two camps discerned 
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in the scholarly literature are applicable to recent discussions on the new type of EU bilateral 
agreements (EU-CA AA, and TTIP). Chapter 5 offers some concluding thoughts.  
2 – Policy space under WTO-umbrella 
To see through the different debates that unfold in scholarly accounts of policy space, we focus 
first of all on the distinction between de jure sovereignty and de facto control of policy space 
(Amsden & Hikino, 2000; Mayer, 2009; Shadlen, 2005). De jure policy space means that a 
government (still) has the formal authority over certain policy tools; if the WTO (or any other 
agreement) limits the ability of, say, export subsidies, this constitutes a de jure restriction of 
policy space. De facto, however, governments may still be able to pursue their goals through 
other ways (Messerlin, 2006). If the policy goal can still be reached in other ways, it is then 
stated that de facto the policy space is not much restricted. The other way around, it can also be 
the case that de facto policy space is more restricted than one would expect under de jure 
restrictions, for example through political or societal pressure steering governments away 
from certain options (Rodrik, 2011; Wade, 2003). In any case, when talking about de facto policy 
space, authors urge us to not focus explicitly on the specific (legal) provisions.  
Ideally, and in principle, this de jure/de facto impact is empirically measurable. In practice, 
however, this may be very difficult, especially for the de facto impact. For example, it might be 
hard to prove that countries systematically steer away from a certain policy option because it 
was ‘pressured’ to do so. On the same note, it can be difficult to show a clear causal link 
between membership in the WTO and a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of social and 
environmental policies. Mosley (2005) acknowledges that these questions are empirically 
difficult, but very important in establishing causal links. She argues that we do not have 
systematic empirical evidence on these links yet, which leads many assessments to rely on 
anecdotal evidence (p. 360).  
In our conceptualization, this is an important point, because a lack of empirical evidence in the 
de facto component (which is often the case) leaves room for interpretation. We argue that it is 
this room for interpretation that is the main dividing line between different arguments. Mosley 
(2005) concurs that interpretation and ideology play a significant role in explaining why different 
evaluations on the impact of several forms of economic globalization still exist. Some 
economists and political scientists (in the public choice tradition) might see constraints on 
government autonomy as favorable, steering away from policy mistakes (Krueger, 1990; 
Mosley, 2005). Others point to market failures to provide public goods, or the importance of 
matching policy tools to the specific national context (Rodrik, 2009). The more uncertainty 
there is (due to a lack of empirical evidence), the more room this opens up for interpretation 
of ‘what could be’ or ‘what should be’.  
In sum, we expect that assessments of policy space by political scientists can both be analyzed 
in terms of the de jure/de facto dichotomy, but that this can be (and often is) linked to some 
extent with the scholar’s own interpretation (and ideological stance) towards the issue. This is 
certainly true when it comes to politicians and practitioners, but we argue that this is also the 
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case for scholars. It is important that these underlying assumptions are made explicit. We will 
therefore focus on both dimensions in our literature study about the impact of the WTO on 
national policy space. 
 
WTO 
The completion of the Uruguay Round (1994) and the establishment of the WTO (1995) 
contained a push to include more (trade-related) domains into trade policy negotiations (such 
as investment, services or intellectual property rights), a further restriction of the use of non-
regulatory instruments (voluntary export restrictions or quotas), and an overarching legal 
dispute settlement system to enforce these provisions (Winslett, 2016; Young & Peterson, 
2006). Most accounts that focus on the nexus between trade governance and policy space have 
therefore focused on the question: does (membership of) the WTO limit a country’s domestic 
policy space to pursue sustainable and equitable development?  
According to a first strand of authors, the WTO certainly entails a de jure restriction of policy 
space, but this is not worrisome. Countries can make mistakes, such as subsidizing an industry 
for the wrong reasons (e.g. corruption) or picking out the ‘wrong’ industry to promote (Milner, 
2009). If totally free, there is always the possibility of bad, costly and destabilizing policy 
choices, which can be avoided by international rules, making policy more efficient (Krueger, 
1990). Furthermore, international engagements are for some countries more credible than 
national legislation, thus increasing trade and investment confidence (Page, 2007). What is 
more, their involvement in international agreements can even broaden their policy space, if 
they were previously constrained by domestic pressure by import-competing sectors (Maggi 
& Rodriguez‐Clare, 1998), or corruption (Pauwelyn, 2012).  
Even in those instances where there is ambiguity about the benefits of restricting policy space, 
some scholars state de facto we can still speak of a significant amount of policy space. First of 
all, the direct impact that the WTO had on existing policy tools was for several countries not 
that far-reaching. Dicaprio and Gallagher (2006) state that many different forms of industrial 
policy that should be inconsistent with the WTO agreements, did not disappear (such as local 
content requirements or import controls), as these countries notified them early on, waited for 
someone to adjudicate it, renamed it, or applied to Special and Differentiated (S&D) treatment 
to keep it in place.  
This S&D in general, secondly, provides several opportunities and measures to make the trade 
regime relevant for developing countries (B. Hoekman, 2005). This is “the product of the co-
ordinated political efforts of developing countries to correct the perceived inequalities of the post-war 
international trade system by introducing preferential treatment in their favour across the spectrum of 
international economic relations” (Gibbs, 1998 in Fritz, 2005). It includes provisions such as 
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longer implementation times, provisions to safeguard the trade interests of developing 
countries or measures to increase trading opportunities2 (WTO, 2016).  
Next to this general exemption, thirdly, different policy windows stay open in specific 
agreements. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, for example, still 
leaves enough space for developing countries to use subsidies for sustainable development 
(Ayala, Gallagher, & Network, 2005). Amsden & Hikino (2000) echo this, by stating that there 
are no legal constraints (but there may be political) that steer governments away from taking 
the same path as the New Industralized Countries (NICs). Lastly, governments have many 
horizontal policy options, such as innovation, infrastructure and education that are totally 
unrestricted by WTO provisions (ICTSD & World Economic Forum, 2016). This relates to a 
belief that vertical industrial policy tools (subsidies, tax cuts, quotas) are rife of government 
failures, necessitating an avoidance of these strategies (Lerner, 2009).  
A second group of authors argue both that de jure restrictions are not always beneficial, and 
that de facto the situation is not more lenient, but worse, leading them to evaluate the global 
trade governance as ultra-restrictive (Rodrik, 2007; Shadlen, 2005, UNCTAD, 2014). First of all, 
there are undoubtedly several damaging restrictions in WTO agreements, with the agreement 
on intellectual property rights (TRIPS) as the leading example (Shadlen, 2008). Especially far-
reaching provisions on patent rights are claimed to have a negative impact on access to 
medicines (Wade, 2003; Shadlen, 2008) or the commonly used strategy of reverse-engineering 
(Shadlen, 2005). Secondly, the exemptions that S&D provides are not evaluated as being 
effective, stating that it has not helped to alleviate structural weaknesses in developing country 
economies (Dicaprio & Trommer, 2010; Fritz, 2005; B. M. Hoekman, Michalopoulos, & Winters, 
2003). Thirdly, there is direct pressure from dominant governments (the US and the EU; 
Shadlen, 2005) or international organizations (IMF, World Bank, WTO) to steer away from 
alternatives that are still around, and to subscribe to a neoliberal growth strategy (market 
access, deregulation, privatization). Fourth, tools that may legally (de jure) be available (such 
as certain subsidies) may in practice not exist, given their financial cost (Mayer, 2009) or the 
asymmetry in types and frequency of subsidies that developing and developed countries use3 
(Amsden, 2000). There is furthermore legal uncertainty around several subsidies’ accordance 
with SCM (predominantly on renewable energy) which in itself is a de facto constraint on the 
(frequent) use of it (Howse, 2013; Rubini, 2012).  
Underlying these evaluations is the indignation that the instruments and policy tools that have 
historically been used by now advanced economies to protect and promote creative and 
productive sectors, violate the prevailing rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
can thus no longer be used. They imply that today’s developed countries are “kicking away 
the ladder” that allowed them to climb to where they are now (Chang, 2002). Wade (2003) 
                                                          
2 The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), for example, is such a type of S&D, for example.  
3 Subsidies for R&D or financial services are allowed, even though this is more important for already developed 
nations.  
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argues that including different domains under the trade umbrella of the WTO has crucially 
shaped the context and discourse surrounding these issues, from ‘avoiding discrimination’ 
towards ‘avoiding any kind of trade barrier’. 
In sum, evaluations about policy space under the WTO umbrella are closely connected to the 
scope of the analysis, be it on de jure or de facto forms of policy space (Shadlen, 2006). This 
scope-like decision, however, is apparently closely connected to interpretation or ideology of 
the author, be they politicians or scholars. What is remarkable in this respect is that the two 
scholarly camps that emerge from the literature, building on the de jure/de facto dichotomy, 
resemble the two viewpoints promulgated in the public debate pretty well. Here too, we see a 
group that thinks rules are necessary, and that there are many possibilities still on the table; 
and a group that evaluates the WTO-environment as very restrictive. Of course, a scholar that 
focuses on de jure constraints (or on the many de facto problems) does not always do this 
primarily out of ideological considerations (in theory, many positions are possible that are 
unrelated to de jure/de facto dichotomy as well), but the parallels between the scholarly and 
public debate are such that we cannot exclude the role of underlying assumptions. In the 
following paragraphs and chapters, we show that the these two camps can be found in debates 
going beyond the WTO as well.   
The bilateral push 
The deadlock of the Doha Developing Round has brought alternative liberalization platforms 
back to the front (Aggarwal & Evenett, 2013; Woolcock, 2013). Next to so-called plurilateral 
agreements that focus on certain subjects with a smaller amount of countries (such as the 
Environmental Goods Agreements or the International Technology Agreement4), a trend 
towards more bilateral or regional agreements can be witnessed since the year 2000 (see figure 
1). These agreements (both by the EU and US) go deeper in certain domains covered by the 
WTO (WTO+), but also include domains previously not under WTO-umbrella (WTOx)5 (Horn, 
Mavroidis, & Sapir, 2010). Figure 2 shows this trend towards a deepening of the trade policy 
agenda.  
                                                          
4 These are all negotiated under the framework of the WTO. 
5 Such as the Singapore issues or labour and environmental standards.  
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Figure 1 & 2. 1: Number of trade agreements entered into force by year. Source: WTO RTA-IS Database 
2: Depth of trade agreements over time. Vertical lines are standard errors. Source: (Dür, Baccini, & Elsig, 
2014) 
Both this deepening and widening of the agenda has triggered renewed questions about a 
restriction of policy space. Particularly because this agenda contains exactly those domains 
that proved sensitive, or even impossible, to reach conclusions on in a multilateral setting 
(such as the Singapore issues: investment, competition and procurement). Horn et al. (2009) 
argue that the EU and US have used FTAs to spread their own regulatory systems, which was 
possible given the asymmetry in negotiation power in one-to-one negotiations (Winslett, 
2016). By getting into these agreements, however, countries, and especially developing 
countries, are surrendering policy space which they have fought for fiercely on the multilateral 
level (UNCTAD, 2014). Given that these international treaties are very hard to get out of, 
several authors have dubbed this a ‘new constitutionalism’, whereby trade and investment 
agreements are used to ‘discipline’ neoliberal policies (Gill, 1995). 
Cho and Dubash (2003) show, for example, that the investment provisions in the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI, which was struck down in the late 90s) would have a 
significant restricting effect on policy space regarding measures around sustainable 
development. These provisions, however, are now commonly reappearing in bilateral 
investment treaties with the US and EU (Berger, 2013). In terms of intellectual property rights, 
secondly, NAFTA goes beyond the exemptions that were (to some) possible under the TRIPS 
regime (Shadlen, 2008). In terms of tariffs as well, the provisions are more stringent, given that 
the WTO only ‘binds’ tariffs (installing a threshold that forbids a country to go above it), while 
bilateral agreements speak of completely eliminating tariff lines (Shadlen, 2006). Anderson 
(2009) argues that EU agreements do not provide a type of S&D treatment for developing 
countries in FTAs.  
Whatever the reasons to get into these bilateral deals (Baccini & Dür, 2012; Baldwin & 
Jaimovich, 2012; UNCTAD, 2014), the consensus is that these countries have negotiated with 
improved market access in mind, rather than preserving policy space (Wade, 2003). The 
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underlying concern is that trade agreements serve to lock in existing comparative advantages 
that countries have, limiting their ability to protect emerging infant industries, and as such 
stifling further diversification of their economies (Shadlen, 2005; ECDPM, 2014). This lack of 
industrial policy tools could lead them to use social and environmental dumping to increase 
competitiveness of their companies, or to attract foreign capital (De Ville, Orbie & Van den 
Putte, 2016).  
Here too, the opposite arguments can be discerned given that several authors argue that FTAs 
bind their partners in a way that is beneficial for exports, leading to a higher international 
economic activity and ultimately raising their development levels (Hvidt Thelle et al., 2015). 
Woolcock (2014a) argues that the EU is very flexible and attentive to the specific needs of 
developing countries, leaving several exemptions, transition periods, technical assistance and 
aid. What is more, if there are any excesses that bilateral agreements produce, there are other 
elements or measures that offset these, such as provisions that help in building trade capacity 
and strategy (OECD, 2001). The Aid for Trade unilateral agenda of the EU for example, is 
contractually imposed through bilateral agreements such as the EPAs (DiCaprio & Trommer, 
2010). Chapters on sustainable development as well have the goal to limit the potential 
negative impact of a trade agreement on social or environmental standards (Perulli, 2014). 
Shadlen’s (2006) main message is that, while we cannot be blind towards the restrictions that 
the WTO has imposed in comparison to the GATT (debates remains unsettled there), this 
debate becomes less outspoken when compared to the additional restrictions that bilateral 
deals with the US and EU are adding. Here, we showed that two views still persist, and that 
this older WTO-debate might still be relevant today. In the next chapter, we go deeper into 
two recent EU FTAs, to track these arguments and see if they resemble these two different 
views. 
3 – A new wave of EU FTAs: same arguments? 
Even though the shift towards bilateral agreements holds several pitfalls or dangers that we 
must be aware of, literature on the impact of deep and comprehensive EU agreements with 
respect to policy space are very rare. Predominantly, this is related to the recent nature of this 
type: most of these agreements were announced after 2006, entered into force after 2013, are 
still being negotiated or have to be ratified. Still, the evolutions towards more, deeper and 
broader trade agreements is a phenomenon particularly witnessed in the EU (Araujo, 2016; 
Lechner, 2016; Dür et al., 2014). It is interesting to see therefore, whether the distinction 
between the two camps described above is applicable in debates about policy space in these 
new types of EU agreements as well. To illustrate that this is indeed the case, we analyze 
evaluations and assessments about policy space with regard to two EU agreements, one with 
Central America, and one with the United States. These trade agreements were selected to 
have (political and scholarly) debates on both North-South and North-North agreements. For 
each agreement the most controversial aspects will be discussed.  
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EU-Central America Association Agreement 
The ‘Global Europe’ trade strategy launched in 2006 marked the starting point of a new 
generation of free trade agreements through which the EU would prioritise its economic 
interests and competitiveness: ‘… economic factors must play a primary role in the choice of 
future FTAs.’ (European Commission, 2006). Notwithstanding these ambitions to focus on 
emerging or more affluent economies, the EU also continued the trade negotiations with the 
ACP countries, which started in 2002, and would also conclude a trade agreement with Central 
America. 
In addition to the selection of trade partners, the EU also intended to expand the scope of the 
trade agreements by including trade and non-trade issues that were significantly more 
ambitious than what was tabled or negotiable at the WTO level. The EU’s quest for reciprocal 
market access and the elimination of non-tariff barriers in its trade relations with developing 
countries caused a great deal of controversy among scholars, politicians and activists. 
The EU-CA AA was negotiated from October 2007 to May 2010. During the nine negotiation 
rounds there was only little public and scholarly attention dedicated to the agreement both in 
the EU and in Central America. Mainly because the EU was pursuing a trade agreement with 
Peru and Colombia during the same period and most efforts concerned the human rights 
situation in Colombia. In Central America CAFTA-DR, the trade agreement with the US in 
force since 2007, remain the centre of attention (Bierbrauer & De Goede, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the EU aimed at securing access to the Central American market which was at 
least equivalent to that of the US, entailing that the concessions in the agreement would be as 
far-reaching (Woolcock et al., 2012). Indeed, the trade pillar of the Association Agreement is a 
comprehensive free trade agreement, covering over 95% of tariff lines and trade as well as, 
among others, border services, establishment (but not investment protection), public 
procurement, intellectual property rights and regulatory barriers (such as Technical Barriers 
to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures). 
The trade pillar of the EU-CA AA has been provisionally applied since 2013, whereas the 
pillars on cooperation and political dialogue are still awaiting ratification by all the EU 
member states6. Research on the consequences of the implementation of the trade pillar is rare, 
mainly because the process of implementation is still ongoing and it is therefore quite early to 
observe the impact (Honduran official, 2016). Debates on plausible effects, have been ongoing 
since the negotiations, even though on a small scale. The different views on the impact of the 
EU-CA AA on policy space illustrate the de jure/ de facto divide that was introduced earlier. 
On the one hand there have been actors confirming the de jure impact without perceiving this 
as problematic for the remaining de facto policy space. On the other hands, others worry that 
the impact of the EU-CA AA will have a significant restraining impact on the policy space of 
the Central American countries. These views will be clustered around three claims proponents 
of EU trade agreements with developing countries put forward, namely (1) bilateral are better 
than unilateral trade arrangements, (2) the EU has flexible and differentiated approach 
                                                          
6 At the time of writing only 17 member states have ratified the Association Agreement (General Secretariat of 
the Council, 2016) 
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towards developing countries and (3) negative impacts will be countervailed by cooperation 
and the chapter on ‘trade and sustainable development’. 
Bilateral are better than unilateral trade arrangements  
Before the Association Agreement, all Central American countries were GSP beneficiaries. 
Karel De Gucht, the then Trade Commissioner, stated during the public hearing on the EU-
CA AA in the European Parliament that ‘One of the main benefits of the Agreement is that will 
replace that unilateral system with a stable, predictable and reciprocal framework. This means more 
legal certainty for companies, encouraging investment and business expansion’ (De Gucht, 2012). The 
risk of losing preferential access to the European market under GSP and the relief of relying 
on a bilateral trade agreement was also emphasized by a Costa Rican official (2015). These 
arguments in favour of concluding the EU-CA AA show a focus on the de jure implications of 
the agreement, namely safeguarding market access. Arguments of WTO-compatibility are also 
often used in this context. 
Scholars have explained the logic for developing countries for securing market access in 
exchange for deeper commitments in regulatory harmonization (Shalden, 2005). Manger and 
Shadlen (2014) explain through the concept of ‘Political Trade Dependence’ that countries that 
depend on a large share of preferential export are more likely to seek instead of unilateral 
preferences trade agreements in highly asymmetrical negotiations even if development 
concerns are not high on the agenda. Those who focus more on the de facto impact of the 
bilateral agreements will highlight theses consequences of regulatory concessions 
development policy tools (Heron, 2011). In their view, the short term benefits of trade benefits 
through securing market access do not add up to the sacrifices made on regulatory policy 
autonomy. 
On a more general de facto level, there are concerns that bilateral agreements such as the EU-
CA AA will reduce the policy space available for governments to define and implement 
policies for the promotion of sustainable development and poverty eradication according to 
the country’s specific needs and capacities (ALOP, APRODEV, Oidhaco, CIFCA, & Grupo Sur, 
2011). In addition there is also the fear that by adhering to the deep trade agendas, countries 
get stuck in a model  they cannot pursue their own interests and limit their ability to respond 
to the current crisis with regulatory reforms , structural and macroeconomic and appropriate 
rescue programs , and that may have exposed them unnecessarily to the contagion of global 
economic system failures (Tolentino & Tovar, 2010). 
The EU’s flexible and differentiated approach  
The EU’s differentiated approach, including exemptions, transition periods and technical 
assistance, has been researched by Woolcock (2014b). Based on an analysis of recent EU FTAs, 
he affirms the EU’s discourse claiming it differentiates its trade liberalization policy according 
to its trade partner. The policy towards emerging markets is more reciprocity-based, whereas 
Least Developed Country (LDC) would enjoy a more development-based approach. In 
addition, Woolcock’s study suggests a differentiation between LDCs and middle income 
developing countries. This de jure assessment is also put forward by De Gucht, when he 
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assures the EU-CA AA is ‘…very balanced: That is because we have negotiated it with the different 
levels of development of our Central American partners firmly in mind’ (2012).  
Others have a less positive assessment of the so-called ‘tailor-made’ agreement. They look at 
the de facto impact on the on the country’s policy space based on the negotiation dynamics of 
the EU as well as the effectiveness of the differentiated approach. Concerning the negotiations, 
NGOs accused the EU of not walking the talk about liberalization by acting in a rather 
protectionist way (Tolentino & Tovar, 2010). The EU’s assertive attitude was confirmed by a 
Costa Rican trade official (2015). These negotiations led to a very comprehensive agreement, 
including commitments that were off-limits at the WTO level like the Singapore issues. 
According to some, the flexible approach of the EU will not be effective to overcome the 
asymmetry between the levels of development of both trade partners. A Honduran official  
(2016) stated that even though they have 15 years to prepare their market for the arrival of a 
number of duty-free and quota-free products, transition periods are not sufficient to change 
their internal economy. That is because the necessary reforms demand more than only time 
and the country does not have the needed capacity. Overall, there is very little knowledge on 
the effects of the trade agreement, leaving room for interpretation on the de facto implications. 
Similarly, Heron (2011) predicts in the context of the EPA with CARIFORUM, that due to the 
lengthy transition periods designed to cushion the effects of liberalization, it is likely to be 
some time before the long-term development consequences of the agreement become clear. In 
the case of Central America, NGO’s are warning on the impact of small farmers that will never 
be able to compete with EU or US producers and the risks this competition bears for their food 
sovereignty (Pérez, 2015).  
Countervailing measures 
In addition to the differentiated approach, the Association Agreement foresees several 
measures to ensure sustainable development. According to proponents of the de jure view, 
these commitments should be sufficient to compensate negative consequences the agreement 
might cause and thus limit the de facto constrains on sustainable development. The EU-CA 
AA includes, in line with the other recent EU FTAs, a chapter on ‘trade and sustainable 
development’. Through this chapter both parties ‘commit to respect, implement and enforce a series 
of universal standards on labour rights and the environment shared by Europe and Central America’ 
(De Gucht, 2012). It would also function as a safeguard against countries lowering their 
standards to be more competitive. In addition to these provisions in the trade pillar of the EU-
CA AA, the cooperation pillar also provides financial and technical assistance under the 
relevant EU instruments for this purpose (Woolcock et al., 2012). The commitments to promote 
sustainable development through its trade agreements have also been reaffirmed in the latest 
EU trade strategy, ‘Trade for all’ (European Commission, 2015c). 
Critics refute these beliefs by stating the commitments are not adequate and will therefore not 
prevent a constraining effect on the de facto policy space to advance sustainable development 
in the Central American countries. First, there is the asymmetry in enforceability of trade and 
non-trade issues. Trade issues are follow-up closely by both parties, through several 
committees and legally enforceable if necessary. The chapter on trade and sustainable 
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development on the other hand rely on softer mechanisms. In addition, the cooperation pillar 
has still not entered into force, which has disappointed many Central American actors. Many 
voice their disillusion because they feel deceived by the EU’s promise of comprehensive 
cooperation to accompany the trade pillar.  
 
The different evaluations along the de jure/ de facto divide illustrate that the interpretation of 
policy space can lead to diverging conclusions. As indicated by Mosley (2005), further 
empirical research, informed of the potential ideological influence, is necessary. The case of 
Central America is an interesting and challenging case in this regard, grouping six countries 
marked by their own characteristics, and a strong influence of the US.    
 
TTIP 
The question of policy space in developed countries is under-researched, not in the least – and 
obviously – since specific North-North bilateral agreements are a rather recent phenomenon. 
Both the US and the EU have since the second part of the 2000s started to focus more on 
economically relevant partners, predominantly emerging economies. For the EU, this was 
translated into the ‘Global Europe’ trade strategy (2006), which indicated a shift towards 
countries that have a significant market potential and still upheld several barriers to export7. 
The continuation of this strategy meant that more North-North agreements were being 
negotiated as well. Two agreements have already been signed, with South Korea (2010) and 
Canada (2014)8, while agreements with Japan and the US are underway. Especially the latter 
(and, attached to it, the concluded agreement with Canada) has triggered a lot of attention and 
criticism, amongst others on the basis that governments’ ability to regulate in the public 
interest will be curtailed. The reason for focusing on TTIP is thus compelling, since it has (re-
)politicized a debate about the possible consequences of free trade agreements in terms of 
policy space within Europe. In this respect it becomes interesting to assess the claims used by 
both advocates and critics, to see whether the same evaluations can be discerned in this 
context. Here, we focus on two of the most contentious aspects of the deal: regulatory 
cooperation and the ISDS clause. 
Regulatory cooperation 
Eliminating differences in regulation that contain significant costs for doing business across 
the Atlantic is one of the largest, and most contested, parts of TTIP. More than 80% of the 
(potential) benefits stem from this pillar (CEPR, 2013), but at the same time critics argue that 
the far-reaching character of these provisions would have detrimental effects on (future) 
standards and regulations (De Ville & Siles-Brugge, 2015). TTIP aims to address both the 
general process of regulatory policy-making (i.e. horizontal provisions) and seven sectoral 
chapters to deal with existing regulatory divergences in domains such as textiles, vehicles or 
                                                          
7 At the time, ASEAN, Korea, Mercosur, India, Russia and the Gulf Co-operation Council were listed as priorities. 
8 This deal is still to be ratified by both the European Parliament and Member State parliaments, and it is unclear 
at the moment whether this will come into force.  
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pharmaceuticals. For the purpose of this paper, we only focus on the former, horizontal, 
provisions9.  
The horizontal chapter contains two big parts: (i) a chapter on ‘Good Regulatory Practices’, 
which is meant to “promote good governance in the regulatory process, in particular 
transparency, predictability and accountability” (European Commission, 2016a), which 
involves information exchange, stakeholder consultation and impact assessments; (ii) 
‘Regulatory Cooperation’ which serves to help regulators work together more efficiently on 
future and existing regulation, so that divergences can be avoided when possible (European 
Commission, 2016b). For the critics, as we shall see below, these propositions entail a direct 
attack on the democratic and precautionary principle in Europe (CEO, 2014) and hence risk 
limiting the policy space for governments to adopt regulations in the public interest. 
Advocates, on the other hand, claim the opposite, and point to the many benefits that this 
chapter will entail.  
There are, firstly, those analyses or assessments that focus on the (absence of) de jure 
components of the regulatory cooperation chapters, a minimization of the risk this entails for 
policy space, and a generally favorable position towards Transatlantic rules that govern 
regulatory policy-making.  
The main point here is that these policy makers and scholars10 see very few formal constraints 
that will limit a state’s capacity to act. The fact that this chapter is a type of ‘soft law’ (rather 
than enforceable provisions), which makes it by nature something without a lot of teeth (Siles-
Brügge, 2016), already facilitates taking this position. Commissioner Malmström has stressed 
time and time again that “no trade agreement will ever lower the levels of consumer, environmental 
or social and labour protection we decide on in Europe” and that “nothing in trade deals will limit the 
EU's right to make new policies in the public interest” (Malmström, 2016a). There were several 
controversial elements in the original textual proposals that have been altered in subsequent 
versions (such as a limiting of the scope) which limit de jure restrictions and make it 
discursively easier to state that the worst elements have been left out. It was also explicitly 
stated that the institutional structure “will not have the power to adopt legal acts” (European 
Commission, 2015a). To further assuage fears, the Commission has inserted several provisions 
relating to a general “right to regulate” clause. These state, amongst other provisions, that 
regulatory cooperation “shall aim at improving, and not reduce, undermine or otherwise compromise 
the level of protection in public policy areas and that the Parties are not bound by any regulatory 
outcome (European Commission, 2016a).  
The principles and provisions in the chapter are furthermore seen as beneficial, ensuring a 
good regulatory environment across the Atlantic, in which regulatory divergences in the 
future are kept to a minimum (European Commission, 2013), possibly freeing up funds for 
public services or enforcement of regulation (Malmström, 2015). Several academics have sided 
with this view, claiming that TTIP can become some sort of ‘transatlantic policy laboratory’ 
                                                          
9 For a broad evaluation of the goals and effect of TTIP, see De Ville & Siles-Brügge (2015).  
10 Scholars that are referenced in the upcoming paragraphs are not automatically pro or contra, but are cited on 
content.   
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that helps in identifying the best solutions to regulatory problems (Wiener & Alemanno, 2015), 
and will simultaneously enhance efficiency, increase consumer safety and improve 
competitiveness of US and EU firms (Chase & Pelkmans, 2015). 
A second view tends to go further than de jure restrictions, stating that de facto the situation is 
worse (whatever the provisions de jure are). De Ville (2016) argues in this respect that “concerns 
about TTIP are not only based on the letter of the proposals, but also on the normative context 
in which they are rooted”, urging us to consider the fact that all provisions in TTIP are part of 
a trade agreement, that has the elimination of barriers as its prime function (Siles-Brügge, 2016). 
There are different ways in which critics foresee that the horizontal chapters might have more 
(negative) effects than what the text itself prescribes, and could as such hamper, delay or 
abolish future regulations, that might have served public interest goals (CEO, 2014). 
First, provisions on ‘transparency and consultation’ could, through the enhanced involvement 
of outside actors (read: business organizations), lead to the delay or abolishment of proposed 
regulation (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015). Improving access to stakeholders (somewhere 
coined the “institutionalization of lobbying” (Goyens, 2015a) could worsen biases in policy-
making, given the existing asymmetries in resources between interest groups (Bartl, 2015; 
Hanegraaff, Beyers, & Braun, 2011). Secondly, the envisaged ‘convergence’ on procedures to 
take out impact assessments (IA) is claimed to be a shift towards the US IA-model (Bartl, 2016), 
which systematically uses neoclassical welfare cost-benefit analyses (with the accompanied 
monetizing or measurement problems, see e.g. (Ackerman & Heinzerling, 2002)), and a risk-
approach towards regulation (Lofstedt, 2011). This would alter the use of science and the 
burden of proof when deciding upon regulation (Bartl, 2015). Combined with the fact that new 
regulations should be the “least trade restrictive” as possible to reach the public policy goal, 
several critics think this could lead to “paralysis by analysis” (Siles-Brügge, 2016), making far-
reaching regulation in the future more difficult to obtain. Thirdly, sociological and learning 
effects amongst regulators and policy officials might lead them to adopt a common approach 
to regulation, in an overarching trade framework, seeing their objectives in terms of 
minimizing the effects on trade and investment (Bartl, 2015). 
ISDS 
The same divide can be discerned when analyzing the controversial investor-to-state-dispute-
settlement (ISDS) mechanism, where the debate has also “become very heated, with ideological 
considerations mixing in with actual facts” (Schubert & Saz-Carranza, 2016). The intention behind 
this clause is to protect investors in foreign countries by providing them an enforcement 
mechanism in case of discrimination or (in)direct expropriation. This has the form of access to 
an international (private) tribunal that has the power to demand financial compensation from 
the state. Critics have argued that far-reaching provisions in this domain would attack (or 
hamper the development of) regulations in the public interest, as they can be sued by investors 
who see these interfere with their (future) profits, and as such policy space to regulate is 
constrained.  
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On one hand there are assessments claiming that the ISDS/ICS11 clause “ensures that a state can 
never be forced to change legislation” (Malmström, 2015). To strengthen this claim, again a “right 
to regulate” clause has been inserted to restore trust and legitimation in the system; the ability 
of investors to take a case before the tribunal has also been more precisely defined (European 
Commission, 2015b). Furthermore, there is always an annulment clause allowing states to 
challenge the final judgment, as a final guarantee of a state’s right to regulate (Schubert & Saz-
Carranza, 2016). Besides the focus and claims that the de jure limitations are harmless, they 
stress that the system in itself is beneficial and necessary to protect investment, especially in 
TTIP, given that jurisdictions in the US are not properly enforcing international treaties 
(Malmström, 2015c) 
Evaluations more critical in nature have attacked these positions in two respects. Firstly, they 
state that the so-called ‘harmless’ de jure restrictions are certainly not to be underestimated. 
Broude, Haftel, and Thompson (2016) show that renegotiations of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) have tended to include broader and stronger investor rights, leading to a significant 
decrease of policy space12. Furthermore, legal scholars have questioned if inscribing a “right 
to regulate” will clarify interpretations for judges or arbitrators (Lester, 2015). Van Harten 
(2015) even stated that the Commission has inserted “poison pills” into the new proposal, 
while “pretending to protect the right to regulate, […] leaving catches in the text that return 
us to the usual concerns about ISDS” (p. 5). A study by several rejectionist NGOs concluded 
that some of the high-profile cases in history would have an equal chance of coming to life 
under the newly proposed ICS system (Cingotti et al., 2016). Smaller arguments too are 
refuted: the annulment clause seems ineffective as only 23% of requests for annulment were 
granted (Schubert & Saz-Carranza, 2016) and the so-called systemic deficiency in the US legal 
system that would necessitate ISDS in TTIP is according to Kleinheisterkamp (2014) also 
absent. 
Going further than challenging de jure claims, they state that de facto the situation is even worse. 
Most prominent here is the argument of “regulatory chill”: simply the awareness that 
expensive lawsuits could be invoked, could prevent governments of regulating in the public 
interest; a “right to regulate” on paper is, according to Goyens (2015b), not easily implemented 
in real life, with different pressuring actors. Also, they claim that the system is inherently 
biased pro-business, as only foreign investors can initiate claims (Schubert & Saz-Carranza, 
2016), and that this has not withered away with the new system (Van Harten, 2015).  Lastly, 
opponents also reject the fact that investment protection would be necessary in an agreement 
with the US, as both entities already have well-functioning legal systems, and including ISDS 
would only strengthen the ability of multinational corporations to raise legal challenges 
against all sorts of regulations (Jarman, 2014).  
The main take-away from both these discussions is that the debate about how far the 
provisions (for regulatory cooperation or ISDS) would constrain a country’s policy space to 
act in the public interest is characterized by the same two camps witnessed in earlier chapters. 
                                                          
11 In September 2015 the Commission proposed its updated version of the investment chapter, labelling it ICS: 
Investment Court System. See: European Commission (2015b). 
12 The only type of FTAs where this was not the case was between two ‘Southern’ countries.  
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One side stresses the benefits of rules and argues that this does not constrain policy space in 
any significant way; the other points to more ‘yet to see’ effects that in any way go beyond 
what is written in the textual agreements. The space for interpretation also opens up in cases 
of lack of empirical research, as with regulatory cooperation. Friedrich Merz, a former German 
MEP, has strikingly formulated his criticism on anti-TTIP activists, and as such shows what 
the debate is actually debate: “The fact that he [Thilo Bode], an activist for Foodwatch and staunch 
TTIP opponent] is speaking of hypothetical scenarios … demonstrates that he can’t find anything in the 
texts to prove his point.” (POLITICO, 2016). This clearly shows the focus on de jure provisions in 
the text. If critics address these claims, they cannot say they spread misinformation. Rather, a 
too narrow focus on the text, and as such a selected and strategic reading of TTIP might be the 
biggest concern. 
4 – Conclusion 
UNCTAD’s 2014 study, which we quoted in the beginning of this paper, refers to our overall 
research theme as ‘the enduring case for policy space’. This implies that debates about the 
relationship between international trade governance (or economic globalization more broadly) 
and the domestic policy space to pursue the appropriate path of equitable and sustainable 
growth are still unsettled. In this paper we firstly showed that the scholarly literature itself is 
divided: there are authors who see trade rules as inherently good, and if there are any effects 
to be noticed beyond the textual agreements, they point towards the many options still on the 
table. Opposite to this are scholars who deem the international environment as ultra-
restrictive, as they primarily focus on de facto effects that imply a much worse outcome than a 
de jure focus might predict. Secondly, we looked beyond debates about the WTO and showed 
that this dichotomy in the literature and public debates is in fact still ‘enduring’. The general 
bilateral push, and EU FTAs in particular, resemble the same two camps when arguments 
about a restriction of policy space are raised. This is true for the ‘classic’ North-South 
agreements, as shown for the EU-CA AA, but also for the more recent push towards North-
North agreements, where concerns about the “right to regulate” are widely politicized since 
the TTIP negotiations.  
This enduring case urges us to look at two particular explanations for the divide, that 
simultaneously constitute not only suggestions, but necessary requirements for further 
research. First of all, we have indicated that, as the two camps in the literature closely overlap 
with the public debate on policy space, ideology and interpretation might play an important role 
in academic debates as well. This is not a surprising statement when dealing with social science 
research, nor is it a condemnation of the fact that an author’s own interpretation might slip in 
the choice of research questions or how he/she problematizes the outcome. The fact that this 
might be the case, however, urges us to explicit these assumptions we make. In this way the 
debate would be one step closer in becoming less fogged with interpretations that are 
presented as real outcomes.  
Secondly, and closely related to the former, is that we urgently need more systematic, 
comparative and long-term empirical research on the effects of economic globalization in 
general, and trade governance in particular, on the (perceived) constraints on policy space. 
Echoing Mosley’s (2005) view that we do not have this evidence yet, makes us rely on 
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anecdotal evidence or case studies, and clears the room for interpretation and would-be 
scenarios to slip in.  
For several reasons, these arguments may be even more pressing due to the push for North-
North agreements. Firstly, industrial policies for advanced economies might become more 
important again. Due to Europe’s prolonged economic downturn, a debate is re-emerging 
about a new industrial policy for Europe that could reintroduce the use of – formerly key – 
national tools (such as subsidies or general trade protection for infant industries) (Pianta, 
2014). It is therefore interesting to see how intra-European developments towards such a new 
policy could co-exist with commitments made in the WTO or bilateral agreements such as 
TTIP13. Secondly, not only is the knowledge we have on the effects of (institutionalized) 
regulatory cooperation limited, but the empirical evidence on the extent to which regulatory 
policies themselves unduly inhibit trade (and the question if trade agreements should do 
something about it) is unsettled (Bown & Crowley, 2016) This touches upon normative 
questions, which by definition are interpreted differently. Thirdly, there are other parts of the 
modern deep trade agenda that will potentially have an impact on policy space as well. The 
negotiations for TiSA (a plurilateral agreement on services), for example, have elicited some 
of the same fears: “we [BEUC] are concerned that TiSA will restrict the ability of the EU and its 
member states to maintain their right to regulate in the future” (POLITICO, 2016b). A broader 
evolution is taking part whereby the authority or competence of international 
institutions/regimes is increasingly penetrating several domains that were previously 
predominantly domestic jurisdiction (Woods & Narlikar, 2001; Zürn, 2004). And lastly, these 
agreements (TTIP, CETA, TiSA, TPP) are argued to be templates of 21st century trade 
agreements, which means whatever is negotiated here, might be replicated to a large extent in 
future agreements with other developing or emerging countries.  
Finding a balance between preserving an open multilateral trading system, while accounting 
for domestic peculiarities, preferences and different development paths is not an easy exercise. 
If we want to move closer to a solution that works for all states alike, understanding the 
different viewpoints in the debate is a first step towards it.  
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